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Appendix 7-B:
Consequences
From Chapter 7: Strengthening Regional Security through G7/8 Sanctions and Force, by John Kirton and Julia Kulik
In Accountability for Effectiveness in Global Governance
edited by John Kirton and Marina Larionova
available from Routledge, 2018
Case | Force | G7/8 Initiator | Commitments | Compliance | Contributor Effectiveness |
Force | |||||
Iraq 1991 | Yes | United Kingdom | 15 N=3 |
+0.42 | Yes |
Kosovo 1999 | Yes | United Kingdom, France, Canada | 24 N=3 |
+0.74 | Yes |
Afghanistan 2002 | Yes | Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States | 41 N=8 |
+0.70 | Mixed | =
Libya 2011 | Yes | France, United Kingdom, Canada | 32 N=5 |
+0.26 | Yes |
Mali 2013 | Yes | France | 8 N=3 |
+0.40 | Yes |
Islamic State 2015 | Yes | United States | 2 N=1 |
+0.88 | Mixed |
Average 6 Uses | n/a | n/a | 122/ 20.3 N=23 |
+0.57 | 66% Success |
Sanctions | |||||
Iran 1980 | No | United States | 12 N=6 |
+0.34 | Mixed |
Afghanistan 1980-2001 | No | United States | 6 N=2 |
+0.42 | Yes by 1987 |
Sudan 2004 | No | 17 N=4 |
+0.81 | Yes | |
North Korea 2006 | No | Japan | 11 N=3 |
−0.29 | No |
Syria 2011-14 | No | 14 N=6 |
+0.93 | Mixed | |
Ukraine 2014 | No | G7 All | 35 N=5 |
+0.68 | In progress |
Average 6 Uses | n/a | n/a | 95/15.8 N=26 |
+0.48 | 33% Success |
Notes: n/a = not applicable.
Commitments = total number of commitments made on the case; N = number of commitments assessed for compliance.
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